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“Buying brains and experts”: 
British Coal Owners, Regulatory Capture and Miners’ Health, 1918 – 1946 
Abstract 
This article examines British coal owners’ use of scientific knowledge of occupational 
lung diseases in the mining industry to resist regulatory changes between 1918 and 
1946. It explores the strategies deployed by coal owners in response to debates over 
the hazard to workers’ health presented by dust, and legislation to compensate miners 
for pneumoconiosis and silicosis contracted in the nation’s collieries.  It investigates 
coal owner deployment of the views of notable scientists, especially the eminent 
physiologist John Scott Haldane (1860-1936), who insisted on the harmlessness of 
coal dust, in order to avoid costly compensation payments, as well as capital 
investment in ameliorative measures to reduce miners’ exposure to such hazards. The 
article provides new insights by illustrating how coal owners influenced mining 
education programmes, deploying the arguments of Haldane and others, with direct 
implications for health and safety in British mines. This contributed to the mounting 
public health disaster wrought by coal dust on Britain’s mining communities.  The 
process is viewed as part of the broader political activities of the coal owners – and 
their industry body, the Mining Association of Great Britain (MAGB) – in its attempts 
	
to influence the regulatory process in period of dramatic change in the political 
economy of coal.  
Introduction 
Addressing the annual conference of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) 
in 1934, James Griffiths, president of the South Wales Miners’ Federation (SWMF), 
launched an impassioned attack on Britain’s coal owners.  Griffiths accused them of, 
“buying brains and experts in order to confuse counsel and the government”, with the 
explicit intention of thwarting the attempts by miners, who had developed silicosis, to 
claim for compensation under the existing regulations.1   
In Britain, silicosis was first recognised as an occupational disease under the 
Workmen’s Compensation (Silicosis) Act, 1918.  After a concerted campaign 
conducted by the MFGB, and particularly by the SWMF, the legislation was extended 
to cover coal miners in 1928 under the Various Industries Scheme.   Revised in 1931 
to include all grades of underground workers and to encompass retrospective awards, 
the regulations still placed the onus on claimants to prove that they had worked in the 
vicinity of rock containing a minimum fifty per cent of free silica.  A further 
amendment in 1934, prompted by the actions of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
and the MFGB, extended the scheme by withdrawing the free silica threshold.  
However, coal miners’ pneumoconiosis (CWP) was not legally recognised as an 
occupational disease by the Home Office until 1943.2    
The contests over the recognition of silicosis and pneumoconiosis, as officially 
prescribed occupational diseases have received attention in the historiography of 
medicine, as have the role of trade unions and regulators.3  In contrast, the role of the 
coal owners has been fleeting. This article examines the strategies of coal owners in 
	
responding to the introduction of the silicosis regulations.  Specifically, it explores the 
relationship between the coal owners and scientists, and the deployment of selected 
findings over the aetiology and pathology of occupational diseases to limit knowledge 
of workplace hazards and combat compensation claims.  It breaks fresh ground in 
uncovering coal owners’ influence over mining education, and their insistence on 
promoting the views of sceptics of the harmfulness of coal dust.  This process 
contributed both to the forestalling of essential health and safety measures that could 
have protected the health of the industry’s workforce, and masked the scale of the 
threat posed by dust.  The effects of this were starkly revealed by the mortality rates 
for CWP after its prescription, with incubation rates typically of between fifteen and 
twenty years; in 1951, deaths from CWP reached 900.  At its peak, between the early 
1950s and late 1960s, it was claiming the lives of 1,600 miners a year across the 
British coalfields.   If the National Coal Board (NCB), which took over management 
of the industry in 1947, in partnership with the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) and the Medical Research Council’s Pneumoconiosis Research Unit, took 
strident steps to combat the problem with some success by the 1950s, then the legacy 
of the neglect of the issue by coal owners continued to be felt in mining communities 
in post-war Britain.4  
The strategy of controlling and containing knowledge of CWP was most evident in 
the education received by colliery managers who had statutory responsibility for 
health and safety in mines; the effect being that officials operated within a narrow 
understanding of the risks posed, what psychologists would refer to as, “bounded 
rationality”. 5 With a few exceptions, mining officials have remained marginalised 
actors in the historiography of coal.6  This article goes some way to redressing this 
imbalance and offers insights into a neglected aspect of industrial relations and the 
	
regulation of health and safety in the nation’s collieries. It provides an example of 
what would be understood now as “corporate political activity”; specifically, through 
the ways in which coal owners sought to “capture” regulatory frameworks, control the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge, dissemble the risks to miners’ health and 
reduce compensation payments.7       
The politics of coal, 1918 – 1946 
The decade preceding the extension of the silicosis regulations had been a turbulent 
one for the coal industry.  The aftermath of the First World War had left many export-
reliant districts bereft of international markets. Debates over whether to nationalise 
the industry under the auspices of the Royal Commission on the Coal Mining Industry 
(hereafter, the Sankey Commission) over the course of 1919-20, were followed by 
major disputes in 1921 and 1926.  Though coal owners were still distinguished by 
their differences, the prerogatives of the years since the First World War had 
necessitated a more united front.  The leaders of the MAGB emerged as, “battle-
hardened veterans of the wars over wages, hours and nationalization”.8  The crisis 
over the Sankey Commission prompted a major reorganization of the body, including 
the constitution of a strong executive, and standing committees including one 
responsible for “propaganda”.9   By 1921 the MAGB had a highly effective 
leadership, epitomised by its president, Evan Williams, and vice-president Sir Adam 
Nimmo, who determined the direction of the body over the next two decades.  Both 
Williams and Nimmo had shown themselves adept, through the parliamentary coal 
lobby and relations with individual government ministers, at “regulatory capture”.  
However, Williams and Nimmo’s successes in putting “nationalisation to sleep”, 
through their performances on the Sankey Commission, and reorganising the MAGB, 
were short-lived.  The same pugnacious style and intransigence that had served the 
	
MAGB so well in 1919 and 1921 increasingly made the coal owners a political 
liability in 1926. While Nimmo and Williams’ belligerent stance won them 
admiration from within their own ranks, it did the MAGB few favours in Whitehall.  
The mine owners famously earned the moniker of the “stupidest men in England” for 
their approach during the lockout from the notoriously hawkish Secretary of State for 
India, Lord Birkenhead, while the liberal deputy secretary to the Cabinet Tom Jones 
famously regarded Nimmo as, “one of the greatest stumbling-blocks to peace”.10 The 
Minister of Labour, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, attempted to foment a coup within the 
MAGB to oust Williams and Nimmo.  The rest of the Cabinet also started to lose 
patience with the intransigence of the owners. President of the Board of Trade, Sir 
Phillip Cunliffe-Lister – perhaps influenced by his shares in mining concerns – 
accused them of being “unreasonable”, and Winston Churchill contemplated 
legislation to force the owners into a national agreement.11   
Their political stock was not aided by the failure of the industry to regulate sales and 
to reorganise in the face of contracting markets.  The colliery companies’ 
undermining of statutory attempts at both, through the Coal Mines Act 1930, further 
inflamed the Department of Mines and lost them political support in the House of 
Commons.  Equally, the coal lobby’s ability to block initiatives for hydroelectric 
schemes in the Scottish Highlands in the late 1930s won them few allies amongst 
other segments of British business. This shows the effectiveness of the MAGB in 
pursing the short-term interests of the owners, while serving to underline the 
industry’s inability to legislate for its own actions. If the coal owners managed to rally 
effectively over major challenges to their direction of the industry, they remained 
ostensibly divided by parochialism and distrust of one another.12   As Outram and 
Supple note, they were a disparate group. On the one hand, the aristocratic colliery 
	
owner (inured in classical governance), alongside corporatist capitalists like Sir 
Alfred Mond, were identifiable as the elite of entrepreneurial capitalists – with the 
“capacity to be an organiser of society in general” – and on the other, the parochial 
and fiercely independent bulk of coal owners, little known outside their own 
districts.13  The coal owners pursued myopic strategies to maintain profit with little 
thought to the future of the industry.  There were a few exceptions to the rule – such 
as the Fife Coal Company (FCC) and the Ashington Coal Company – who invested 
heavily in underground infrastructure, sales and marketing functions, and in the 
professionalization of their management personnel.14  
Coal owner preference for local bargaining characterized their responses to the 
silicosis regulations and campaigns over CWP.  These strategies essentially evolved 
from earlier skirmishes over the policing of health and safety in the industry.  Coal 
owners had opposed the Workman’s Compensation Acts of 1897 and 1906.15 The east 
of Scotland coal owner and founder of the explicitly anti-socialist Liberty and 
Property Defence League, the Earl of Weymss lobbied hard against the legislation.  
His efforts on behalf of the Wemyss Coal Company, reveal traces of those discernible 
in the tactics used by other colliery companies after the extension of the silicosis 
regulations.  Following the advice of the Edinburgh physician Archibald McKendrick 
in his 1912 book, Malingering and its detection under the Workmen’s compensation 
and other acts, the company attempted unsuccessfully to attribute workplace injuries 
to pre-existing conditions and workers’ negligence, to avoid paying compensation.  
While monitoring accidents, they were careful not to inform miners about the 
compensation scheme.  For one miner seriously injured in 1923, the result was the 
deferment of his compensation until 1941. Similarly, in the face of the impending 
legislation, the coal owners of north Wales contemplated terminating the contracts of 
	
all miners aged over 65, “keen to remove employees who presented a bad insurance 
risk”.16  They too referred a growing number of cases to medical referees after the 
passing of the 1906 Act.17  As such, the role of the “expert”, and ownership and 
deployment of scientific evidence, was established as critical to the contests over 
compensation.  
Coal owners and officials regularly presented a case against state intervention 
and downplayed the dangers of mining in the pages of the Colliery Guardian. In 1919 
a letter from a colliery official formed a response to a report in the Daily Express 
highlighting the “harrowing” conditions in the mines of South Wales: “the miners 
occupation is one of the least of the many dangerous occupations … and hysterical 
screaming or sensational distortion of facts will only leave the public as cold as the 
absence of coal is doing”.18 Similarly, in 1926, the owners countered the emerging 
view that the length of shifts underground led to a greater rate of accidents by 
claiming that “workmen finish an eight hours shift with minds and bodies fresher”.19  
In the battle over silicosis and CWP, scientific and technical knowledge 
became essential weapons.  At the centre of this contest over occupational lung 
diseases was one of the world’s foremost physiologists, John Scott Haldane.  
Constructing orthodoxy 
Bufton and Melling have characterised the debate over the effects of coal dust on 
miners’ lungs as a contest between, “‘practical’ scientists aligned with the British 
Coal Masters’ Research Association (BCORA), led by Haldane, and… medical 
specialists associated with Lyle Cummins and the Medical Research Council 
(MRC).”20  Haldane’s views were highly influential in shaping orthodoxy about 
occupational lung diseases. Coal owners consistently used Haldane to counter the 
	
claims of miners’ leaders and their supporters on the harmfulness of dust. An editorial 
in the Colliery Guardian in 1920 is illustrative of this process: “much talk of the 
sloppy sentimental order has been heard of late as to the prevalence of disease 
amongst miners … Haldane and others have shown that the miner actually holds a 
position materially better in this respect than the average member of the 
community”.21    Haldane’s acclaim meant that employers in other sectors also 
consulted him about silicosis compensation cases.  In one particular case, his 
engagement by Reckitt & Sons (manufacturers of starch, and black lead and metal 
polishes) who had been attracted by his work on coal dust, ended equally tragically.  
Haldane assured them in 1923 that the graphite dust used in their works was harmless, 
but in May 1927 Reckitt & Sons were back in contact to say that three of their 
employees working with the dust had developed TB and an independent investigation 
revealed that the dust was in fact harmful; six months later all of the men died, with a 
post-mortem on two revealing silicosis.22 
Haldane’s position on the effects of coal dust on miners was first set out in a 
paper to the Institution of Mining Engineers (IME) in 1916: 
 
The excess in bronchitis among old coal-miners has been attributed to the 
breathing of dust...  But it is very difficult to see why, if dust is the cause, there has 
been so great a diminution in the bronchitis mortality in recent years.  Coalmines 
have… become drier and more dusty with increasing depth and better ventilation; 
and, if dust were the cause, one would have expected the bronchitis to increase, 
whereas it has greatly diminished.23  
 
	
On the basis of research on animals by Professor J. M. Seattle and Dr A. 
Mavrogordato, Haldane concluded that coal (and shale) dust were “relatively 
harmless”, because they “are readily eliminated by the agency of living cells, which 
collect the dust and then wander out with it into the bronchial tubes, whence it is 
swept upwards by the action of the ciliated epithelium which lines the air-passage.”24  
If Haldane was forced to modify his views on the harmful effects of miners’ exposure 
to silica as a result of challenges from his audiences, he remained “hostile […] to 
revisionist ideas on lung disease”, declaring (in response to the growing body of 
evidence on CWP emerging from the south Wales’ coalfield):  “As regards the 
anthracite district in which they are so common […] they are, I believe, primarily 
cases of bronchitis, but aggravated by the secondary collection in the lungs of coal 
and other dust.”25  In 1932, Haldane publicly criticised the Silicosis Medical Board 
and its medical advisers for issuing compensation certificates on the basis of what he 
perceived to be weak clinical findings.  He also used his position on the Health 
Advisory Committee (HAC) of the Department of Mines to launch attacks on south 
Wales medics, engaged in challenging the orthodoxy of Haldane and others based on 
their experiences amongst anthracite miners.26  Despite slightly adjusting his views 
over silicosis in the face of overwhelming evidence, Haldane refused to modify his 
position on coal dust pneumoconiosis right up to his death in 1936.  Indeed Melling 
suggests that by the 1930s, “Haldane appeared more complacent than some anthracite 
mine masters who funded his research...”27   
Though lacking in substantive knowledge of silicosis, Haldane’s impressive body of 
work extending back into the 1880s on health and safety in coal and metalliferous 
mines, as well as his physiological work on environmental conditions on Royal Navy 
warships, and his social connections lent him considerable prestige.  As well as 
	
serving on several Royal Commissions, departmental committees for the Board of 
Trade and the Department of Mines, he was also called upon by various bodies 
internationally for advice on health and safety in mining and lung diseases.  On the 
basis of his evidence to them, the Sankey Commission concluded: “miners are a virile 
class”.28  This was part of a wider strategy by the coal owners to undermine evidence 
presented by miners’ advocates. For example, Alfred Lewis, the General Secretary of 
the National Association of Colliery Managers used the pages of the Colliery 
Guardian to attack Sidney Webb’s evidence on the dangers of mining by claiming it 
was “a vile slander on the colliery managers of our country”.29  
Haldane was also not a lone “merchant of doubt”.30 Other sceptics included Dr 
Edgar Collis, the Home Office’s Medical Factory Inspector.  Like Haldane, Collis’ 
views on occupational lung diseases in mining enjoyed considerable popularity in 
much of the English-speaking world.  As Derickson has illustrated, Collis’ views were 
to prove influential in debates over “black lung” in the United States; Collis declaring 
to an assembled audience at the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical 
Engineers in 1927 that: “coal dust does not in itself appear to exert any particularly 
harmful effect on the lungs”.31  Such views were shared by the medical adviser to the 
TUC, Dr Thomas Legge, as well as the former Chief Inspector of Mines (1908-20) 
and chairman of the board for mining examinations (1912-50), Sir Richard 
Redmayne.32   
Another significant figure in rebutting the coalfield evidence was the first 
Medical Inspector of Mines, Dr Sydney Fisher, appointed in 1927, with the sceptics 
viewing Fisher as a safe pair of hands. Haldane and Collis were instrumental in 
persuading the coal owners and the Department of Mines that Fisher’s appointment 
“did not represent a threat to their interests”.33 As late as 1936, Fisher declared to a 
	
group of mining engineers that coal dust was harmless if the lungs were healthy.  In 
1934, Fisher expressed similar views to the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal 
Mines (the Rockley Commission), influencing their recommendations on dust 
prevention and suppression, prompting them to declare that coal dust was essentially 
“innocuous”.34   
Nevertheless, as Haldane admitted by early 1935, there were differences 
amongst medical experts over the risks posed by silica.  The Silicosis Medical Board 
(SMB) and the MRC’s Industrial Pulmonary Diseases Committee (IPDC) was already 
concluding that another threat existed: “amongst South Wales coal-miners a type of 
pulmonary disease which is disabling but which does not come within the 
radiographic definition of silicosis.”35  On this basis, the MRC launched a major study 
of the disease in south Wales. This research would be crucial to establishing CWP as 
a prescribed industrial disease.  However, the Home Office rejected the MRC’s 
request that in the intervening period the silicosis legislation be changed to allow for 
claims from miners with this condition. Haldane’s views persisted through his 
acolytes and associates, notably the assistant director at the British Colliery Masters’ 
Research Laboratory (BCORL), J. Ivon Graham.36  As late as 1975, the former Chief 
Inspector of Mines, Sir Andrew Bryan – who had a good record in promoting 
improved health and safety – allowed Haldane some grace for his views on coal dust 
on the grounds that, “the death-rate from pulmonary tuberculosis among coal miners 
were below average.”37 Twenty-seven years earlier, the director of the MRC’s newly 
established Pneumoconiosis Research Unit was less forgiving of Haldane, Collis and 
fellow sceptics: “It must be admitted that medical men by their ill-informed 
complacency have a heavy load of responsibility to bear for the present high 
incidence, of pneumoconiosis among coal miners.”38  Such scorn was unsurprising 
	
given the challenges by local doctors and “lay epidemiology” emerging from the 
mining communities led by the SWMF. In 1928, an inquest into the death of miner 
David Isaacs reported a verdict of death “following from acute pneumonia, following 
silicosis and anthracosis [CWP arising from ingestion of anthracite coal dust]”; a view 
that was partly informed by the judgement of the senior pathologist at Cardiff Royal 
Infirmary who certified the mine driver’s death as resulting from both conditions.39  
Deploying “brains and experts”:  coal owner responses to legislation 
The views of Haldane and his fellow sceptics formed a scientific orthodoxy on 
the effects of dust on miners’ health.  The MAGB deployed Haldane’s views to great 
effect, reactively opposing the changes in the 1931 Act, arguing that it was “putting 
legislation too far in advance of scientific knowledge.”40 Colliery companies also used 
such orthodoxy in an attempt to limit payments and retrospective awards, by 
questioning the scientific foundation of compensation certificates.  The campaign for 
compensation and contests over scientific knowledge were played out at a national 
and district level.  The skirmishes over Haldane’s orthodoxy were fought out around 
the “Five Fatal Valleys” of south Wales, so-called because of the high rates of 
advanced occupational lung diseases amongst miners.  Here Haldane’s views on coal-
dust, combined with his findings on the low silica content of the south Wales 
coalfield, were fought over with tenacity.  Behind the scenes, the coal owners had 
acknowledged that they could not stop the extension to the Silicosis Act (conceding 
defeat in 1934), but focused their attentions on limiting the scope of those extensions 
and consequently compensation; Sir Evan Williams, in his capacity as chair of the 
Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Masters’ Association, declaring: 
	
It is inevitable that there will be some extension of the regulations, and the masters 
must try and ensure these extensions are as small as possible.  Silicosis affects 
South Wales more than any other district … and medical examination might prove 
many men to be suffering from silicosis who were not previously aware of it.  And 
resultant claims for compensation would be inevitable.41 
 
As one south Wales medic observed, this was an especially cynical ploy given that: 
“the standards imposed upon the diagnosis of pensionable dust disease almost 
preclude the diagnosis being made at all by the doctors concerned.”42 The defence 
mounted by Cardiff Collieries – for which Sir Evan Williams was a director – 
illustrates one of the ploys used.  The “Scourge of the Rand” tactic – citing coal 
miners prior service in mines in the Transvaal (long associated with silicosis) – saw 
coal masters attempting to export the problem.43  This illustrates the legitimacy 
attached to Haldane’s views, and their use by coal owners.  In this instance, the 
secretary of the Cardiff Collieries, G. D. Budge, drew on a paper that Haldane had 
given to the Institution of Mining Engineers in 1931, in which he posited that 
exposure to coal dust actually had an ameliorative effect on damaged lungs (acting 
with the body to remove some of the silica dust).44  Budge cited this study in 
correspondence relating to the case of a sixty-one year old collier, who having been 
advised by authorities in South Africa that his lungs were “lightly affected” as a result 
of his eight years’ service in the mines of the Transvaal. While Budge acknowledged 
that in the preceding three to four years, the collier’s condition had started to 
deteriorate to the extent that “he is pretty badly affected”, he concluded that his case 
illustrated the persuasiveness of Haldane’s hypothesis: “He does … suffer from the 
effects of the South African dust, but the fact remains that he has worked 16 years in 
	
coal mines since he contracted Silicosis, and even although that Silicosis was not in 
an advanced stage when he left gold mining, the evidence seems to confirm Dr. 
Haldane’s view that coal dust enables some of the silica dust to be removed from the 
lungs.”45  Alongside the district Medical Officer’s, Budge used this case to identify 
silicosis with the Rand gold mines, and endorse the view that there was “no sign of 
any increase in the death rate from this cause [coal dust inhalation].”46   
Over time, the use of such tactics was further encouraged by the rise in 
compensation paid out by the coal companies under the silicosis orders, especially in 
south Wales, where ninety per cent of Britain’s newly diagnosed cases were located.  
One example was at Mond’s Amalgamated Anthracite Colliery Company (AACC), 
which operated Ammanford Colliery at the epicentre of the unfurling public health 
tragedy of CWP in the anthracite coalfields.  Amalgamated Anthracite claimed that 
compensation payments to silicotic miners had reached £80,000 per annum in 1936 
and 1937, rising to £100,000 by 1938.  Under these conditions, AACC sought to 
offset the costs to the company by calling for a “national charge,” on the basis that, 
“the employer is obviously paying for a disability which originated 20, 30, or more 
years ago, when the disease was unknown to coalmining.”47 The pressing financial 
case for companies of finding a solution prompted further research into dust 
suppression, with the AACC setting up its own laboratory to investigate means of 
tackling silicosis but ostensibly to refute emerging evidence about CWP.  This was a 
deliberate attempt to sustain a body of knowledge – which exploited a measure of 
scientific uncertainty over harmful types of dust, and contested the categories and 
boundaries of admissible compensation cases – as a rear guard action in the face of 
acceptance of the overwhelming body of evidence mounting over the hazards of coal 
dust, as indicated by the MRC’s commitment in 1936 to a major south Wales study.48   
	
In north Wales, the owners of Llay Main colliery wrote to Haldane in 
desperation over the case of a miner seeking compensation under the regulations, after 
the company’s doctor and appointed radiologist, along with the worker’s own 
physician, and the district certifying surgeon and TB officer, confirmed the initial 
diagnosis.49  As the company secretary acknowledged to Haldane: “In view of these 
reports it has not been possible for us to refer the matter to the medical referee, there 
being no dispute between the medical advisers for both sides.  It would appear that we 
have nondefence (sic) from a medical point of view.”50   Unfortunately for this miner, 
his claim had been made two days short of changes to the silicosis scheme of 1931, 
which in theory dispensed with the fifty per cent rule applied under the 1928 Act.  
Providing Haldane with samples of rock from the area of the mine where the miner 
had worked, the company secretary, H. Ball, therefore sought his view on whether “it 
affords the Company any protection.”  Ball also lamented the loss of the prescriptions 
of the older silicosis regulations, under which, “less than 50% was a good defence,” 
and confessed that: “From the analysis which we have made, it would appear that a 
large number of our workmen are working in places where they are exposed to the 
dust of silica rock and we are naturally anxious to protect our position.”51  As in south 
Wales, the coal owners sought to elude culpability, by drawing on Haldane’s advice 
to blur categorization and thus eligibility under the scheme.   
In the Durham coalfield – where 422 miners were diagnosed as silicotic, or 
latterly pneumoconiotic, between 1933 and 1948, and there were 46 deaths, with one 
of the highest rates of CWP in the British coalfields by the late 1950s – the coal 
owners were slow to respond.  It was not until the MAGB sent out a circular to the 
coalfields for a programme of investigation of dust levels, influenced more by 
discussions in the recent Rockley Commission about the effects of coal dust on 
	
colliery explosions, that a district committee of investigation was appointed. The final 
report on dust levels published in 1939 revealed that suppression methods were 
sporadic.  Durham coal owners’ complacency over the issue was revealed in 
subsequent discussions arising from the request made by the Durham Miners’ 
Association in 1940 that respirators be provided for those using compressed air drills. 
The Durham Coal Masters’ Mutual Protection Association advised that coal owners 
should not bear the costs, and that they should consider charging workmen.52  
Scotland’s coal owners adopted a multi-faceted approach: firstly claiming that 
silicosis was an English and Welsh problem; secondly blocking evidence gathering; 
and thirdly, as with other coalfields, restricting knowledge.  In this, they were 
reassured by the observations of the Mines Inspectorate, who noted only nine cases of 
certified silicosis amongst miners in Scotland between 1930-8.   Moreover E. H. 
Frazer, Inspector of Mines for Scotland between 1934-8, declared that: “Scottish 
mines are remarkably free from silicosis, possibly because wet conditions, 
unfavourable to dust, prevail in a large proportion of collieries.”53 This obliviousness 
to the threat represented by dust was obvious from Frazer’s equally cavalier remarks 
in his 1936 report, in which he noted that the sporting of respirators by men working 
with coal cutters was, “not on account of the danger of silicosis… but because the 
amount of dust made by modern high speed coal-cutters is unpleasant to breathe.”54   
Nevertheless, with the further extension of the Silicosis Orders in 1934, and the 
hearing of a case against the masters of Tirbach Colliery before the House of Lords 
brought by the SWMF, Scotland’s coal owners were keen to guard against the 
eventuality of legal action.  The Coal Owners of Scotland continued to oppose 
medical examination of miners, and made no perceivable effort to undertake research 
in the area until the 1938 MAGB circular.  Owners opposed monitoring of the 
	
existing workforce (to avoid the risk of any new cases surfacing), but arranged for 
examinations for all new recruits, to eliminate the potential for any future claims. In 
essence, these responses illustrated the confusion around occupational lung diseases 
in Scotland, while reflecting in equal measure the implicit view that this was an 
English and Welsh issue. This indifference was also seen in the approach to dust 
suppression.  Where it was undertaken in Scotland, this was often on the grounds of 
eliminating discomfort rather than the risk to health.  As with the Durham owners, this 
complacency and intransigence was ill-founded and wilfully negligent, as the figures 
for diagnosis of CWP after 1943 for the Scottish coalfields reveal, with over 300 
miners diagnosed with pneumoconiosis in 1947, peaking at over 800 by 1953.55 As 
across other parts of the British coalfields, Scottish coal owners’ principal concern 
was not one of protecting the health of miners, but avoiding compensation claims and 
capital expenditure on ventilation and other safety measures to counteract the harmful 
effects of dust.56   
Peddling orthodoxy: coal owners, experts and mining education 
The damaging effects of the views of Haldane and his fellow sceptics were further 
compounded by their perpetuation in the mining curriculum, and consequently the 
knowledge of mining officials responsible for the day-to-day management of mines.  
This contributed, along with the lack of capital investment in ventilation and dust 
suppression to the mounting public health disaster. Mining officials prior to 
nationalization in 1947 were comparatively poorly-paid, and had a basic level of 
education.  Nearly all were drawn from the ranks of miners; “colliers with a collar 
on”, as one mining engineer, referred to his fellow officials.57  Despite the 
introduction of legislation (in 1872, 1887, and 1911) requiring all managers of coal 
mines to hold certificates of competency, with the examination system approved by 
	
the Home Office from 1911 onwards, one mining lecturer was still moved to observe 
in 1916: 
The State sets up the standard of the examination for first-class certificates, but no 
curriculum of education; hence, if the candidate produces evidence of his having 
had so many years’ experience, and that he is of good character, he may pay his 
fee, sit and pass his examination, and become a first-class certificated colliery 
manager.  It is possible … to have passed under such a system certificated men 
who would be a positive danger if they were entrusted with charge of a colliery.58     
Prompted by concerns over the competency of officials, a committee was appointed 
by the Secretary of State for Mines to inquire into standards.  The Holland 
Committee’s report of 1929 laid bare the shortcomings of the system, with wide 
variations across the country in the training and qualifications of junior officials and 
managers, with the pass rate for examinations being as low as nineteen per cent in 
1928, and seventy per cent of those who did not already hold a mining diploma or 
degree failing the competency exams. This educational and social background was 
very similar to that of superintendents in US bituminous coal mines, but markedly 
different to the far more structured professional development ladder in the coalfields 
of the Ruhr and Limburg in Belgium.59 While a number of modernising coal 
companies, such as the Ashington Coal Company, offered financial support for 
officials to pursue formal mining qualifications and provided more formal 
apprenticeship, they were in the minority.  It might have been the aspiration of some 
within the MAGB, “to raise the profession of mining engineers to a level at least 
equal to that of any other scientific and technical profession,” but the reality for many 
managers within the industry was far removed from this aspiration. One of the main 
reasons for this reluctance on the part of many owners to fund education for officials 
	
was to limit officials’ labour mobility and power. In essence, colliery managers were 
“simultaneously exploited by capital,” as well as being, “exploiters of workers”.60   In 
reality, many also lacked control over the day-to-day operations of collieries.61 
For those able to access formal mining education at one of the technical 
colleges or university mining departments, owners still exerted considerable control 
over the curriculum and the appointment of staff.  Even with grant funding from 
central government, and after 1923 from the Miners’ Welfare Committee, mining 
schools were heavily reliant on donations from companies.  An examination of the 
two main higher education mining schools in Scotland – Glasgow and West of 
Scotland Technical College (GWSTC) on the west coast, and Heriot Watt College 
(HWC) in Edinburgh, on the eastern seaboard – are illustrative.  Crucially GWSTC 
and Heriot Watt also approved courses for mining officials at all of Scotland’s 
technical colleges on behalf of the Home Office.  Companies provided grant funding 
for laboratories and equipment at both institutions.  West of Scotland coal owner 
James Dixon funded a joint Chair of Mining at GWSTC and the University of 
Glasgow to the tune of £15000, while east coast colliery magnate James A. Hood, 
financed a professorial chair at the HWC (subsequently covered by the Lothian Coal 
Masters’ Association).  This funding bought coal owner representation on the 
curriculum boards and selection committees for both institutions.62  Crucially, Hood 
was appointed as Heriot Watt’s internal adjudicator in selecting appointments to the 
National Joint Committee on Preliminary Mining Education, which decided upon the 
content of the mining curriculum.  As one FFC Executive remarked in 1929, after 
donating £1000 to Heriot Watt’s new mining laboratory: “the hands of future 
Governors should not be unduly tied… [he] would have no hesitation in bringing 
before the Governors any personal wish that might occur to him”.63 The Fife Coal 
	
Company’s Chairman, Augustus Carlow, as well as the Fife and Clackmannanshire 
Coal Owners’ Association, also made substantial donations to the mining schools in 
the Fife coalfield.64 
The importance of this as far as the dissemination of Haldane’s views on the 
harmlessness of coal dust was concerned was underlined by the fact that the holders 
of both the Dixon and Hood Chairs during the 1920s and 1930s were adherents to his 
view.  Professor R. W. Dron, Dixon Chair of Mining (1923 – 1932), and committee 
member of the Mining Institute of Scotland Committee on Ventilation (which 
considered dust related occupational lung diseases), acknowledged his gratitude to 
Haldane on the “actual pathological effects of coal dust”.65  In 1921 at James Hood’s 
behest, the Governors at Heriot Watt College invited Haldane to speak to students 
about the “physiology of breathing”.66  Scarcely less damaging was the invitation 
extended by the West of Scotland Mining Students’ Association at GWSTC to 
Sydney Fisher, the Medical Inspector of Mines, in 1934, in which he expounded the 
view that coal dust was essentially harmless if the lungs were healthy.67  Equally 
perturbing was the fact that three years previously, Fisher had declared in a lecture to 
the annual conference of mining teachers at the Safety in Mines Research Board 
experimental station at Buxton that coal dust “is believed to be harmless”. 68 
Moreover, with advocates of Haldane’s view like Redmayne, chairing the central 
body overseeing mining curriculum, and Fisher, as Medical Inspector of Mines, it is 
evident how such views became entrenched amongst mining engineers and the 
Department of Mines.  As such, suggestions that official recognition of CWP, and 
earlier changes to the silicosis regulations, were the result of diligent and persistent 
lobbying by the miners’ unions seem well founded.69 
	
Notwithstanding the weight of these opinions, mining engineers and managers 
(as well as the miners’ unions and local physicians) did challenge the views of 
Haldane and others, as Fisher found out to his cost when expounding upon his views 
of the harmlessness of coal dust both at Buxton in 1933, and to an IME audience in 
1936.  At the latter, one plucky engineer proceeded to question Fisher’s views on the 
basis of his observations of autopsies on miners who had died of occupational lung 
diseases and the accompanying remarks of the attendant pathologist.  Disconcertingly, 
the majority of the audience that day accepted and endorsed Fisher’s views.  
However, other mining engineers were starting to voice their disquiet and frustration 
too, one suggesting in 1935 that medical opinion be disregarded and that attention be 
focused on eliminating all dust in mines, whether siliceous or not.  Nevertheless, the 
general climate of complacency that this inured in even the more progressive, and 
safety conscious of companies, was indicated by the comments made by one of FCC’s 
senior managers (and a future senior NCB director) Dr William Reid in the late 
1930s.  Reid observed of the Company’s provision of free respirators that these had 
been introduced for the comfort of the workers.70   
Haldane’s orthodoxy was sustained locally through its promotion at mining 
schools and by figures within the mining inspectorate, and nationally through his 
public declarations and on national committees within the Department of Mines.  
Though officials had statutory responsibility for health and safety in coal mines, they 
were disenfranchised, beholden to their employers and their knowledge of health risks 
was largely “bounded”.  Nevertheless, some critical voices amongst officials, 
informed by “lay epidemiology”, could be heard, alongside those of union leaders, 
miners, and dissenting medics.  The control exercised by coal owners and scientific 
	
sceptics over mining provision and curriculum further ensured that knowledge of the 
risk to human health of sustained exposure to coal dust was suppressed.   
The science and class location of J. S. Haldane 
Melling observes of Haldane and his colleagues at BCORL, that they were shaped by 
a common introduction to research into mining which underpinned their outlook:  
“Scientists specializing in mining research … learned early in their careers that the 
management culture of the extractive industries gauged the value of scientific work in 
terms of its ‘practical’ understanding of mining and that a good working relationship 
with masters depended on an appreciation of hard economic as well as welfare 
concerns.”71  Certainly Haldane’s opinion was deployed regularly by coal owners and 
his public criticisms of bodies like the SMB and individual physicians buttressed their 
position. Haldane was also on good terms with owners and a number of prominent 
mining engineers like Redmayne. He was director of the Doncaster Coal Masters’ 
Research Laboratory (subsequently BCORL, carrying with it an annual salary of 
£500) between 1912 and his death in 1936, and was the first non-mining engineer to 
be appointed an honorary president of the IME for three years in a row between 1924 
and 1927.72 On the face of it, Haldane would appear to have allowed his social 
background and professional associations to cloud his scientific judgement. 
Haldane certainly shared the coal owners’ antipathy to nationalization of the 
industry, noting to the Sankey Commission in 1919: “I share the general British 
distrust of too much bureaucratic control, and I think that, so far as public health and 
safety are concerned, it would hardly be possible to nationalize coalmining without 
legally stifling initiative and the sense of individual responsibility.”73  Haldane’s 
“distrust of too much bureaucratic control” was also made apparent to the Samuel 
	
Commission in 1925: “If I took orders from the Government I should have done 
nothing whatever in this world.”74 His views can be ascribed to what the radical 
Liberal John Hobson perceived to be the “class sympathies and reverences” of 
“intellectuals”, “sensitive to the approval and disapproval of rulers and other 
authorities … [Their] personal sympathies are engaged in keeping the good opinion 
of successful practical men.”75  
Haldane was born into the gentry, nurtured within a privileged social milieu 
and immensely socially well connected. His brother, John Burdon Haldane, was a 
prominent Liberal (and later Labour) Party MP and government minister.  He counted 
amongst his friends Andrew Carnegie, and the maverick Liberal MP and coal owner 
Sir Arthur Markham.  His own views on relations between capital and labour were 
essentially patrician and expounded in his inaugural presidential address to the IME in 
1924:  
As regards workmen’s organizations … much has been done for the good of the 
mining industry, and the country as a whole, which never could have been done 
without them … it is both the right and the duty of all connected with the mining 
industry to contribute such constructive ideas and actions as they can.  When these 
ideas and actions are contributed in the spirit of comradeship we can receive them 
in the same spirit; but when they are not contributed in that spirit then we must 
just fight them as we fight deleterious gases, coal-dust… 76  
 
For Haldane then “comradeship” within the confines of social stratification, could 
lead to progressive improvements.  His liberal paternalism shared much in common 
with his old friend Markham, as epitomized by the latter’s comments to a sceptical 
mining engineer:  
	
  
Why should you think it inevitable that colliers should live in a state of filth and 
piggery? If you try and make good clean homes and help social work, this tends to 
make better men….77 
Notwithstanding Haldane’s class “location” and allegiances his behaviour can 
also be attributed to his philosophical beliefs and spiritualism.78 Sturdy suggests that 
Haldane’s views were formed by “biological ‘holism’ ”, and the subordination of the 
interests of the individual “to the higher ethical experience of common interest 
apparent in such sentiments as comradeship and patriotism,” through “the intellectual 
project to establish the political primacy of moral sensibilities… over the pursuit of 
particular social policies.”79  Considered in such a way, Haldane’s “idealists’ ethical 
world view”, and his rejection of “individualistic and materialistic utilitarian theory,” 
suggests that rather than simply being beholden to capital, his philosophical 
predilections framed his outlook.  Similarly, his belief in a “functional” “vitalism” and 
“holism”, which led him to believe that the organism regulated itself, may well have 
coloured his judgements as to the hazards presented by coal dust.80  This belief in the 
ability of the body to regulate itself was evident in his address to a Royal Army 
Medical Corps audience in 1919: “the body is no mere machine, but a living 
organism… and it is of the “nature” of a living organism to cure itself.”81  Work by 
the pathologist, James Beattie, on the negligible effects of shale and other dusts on 
guinea pigs, allowed him to extend this hypothesis to miners, supporting his 
contentions about the body’s ability to regulate itself.82  
Added to this was the nature of Haldane’s affinity, and friendships, with 
mining engineers like Redmayne, as “practical men” concerned with scientific and 
technological contributions to social progress. This was reflected in Haldane’s 
	
youthful championing of what he perceived to be the superiority of the advanced 
applied science as practised at German universities over that of his native Scotland, 
after his brief period of studying at the University of Jena in 1879.83   
This was all compounded by Haldane’s growing belief spiritualism in his later 
years.84   Haldane’s capacity for self-sacrifice suggests a man who was genuinely 
affected by a deep devotion to public service and belief in his philosophical and 
scientific principles.  He exposed himself to potentially lethal cocktails of poisonous 
gases during the First World War (while incurring the wrath of the Army for refusing 
to aid in the development of chemical weapons), and starved himself of oxygen to 
investigate the effects of deprivation of the gas on sailors and climbers. His ethics 
were also evident in the model of behaviour he passed down to and encouraged in his 
son, John Burdon Sanderson Haldane, the renowned Marxist biologist.85  The 
“habitus” of his upbringing, formative experiences and social milieu evidently shaped 
him, as did the “field” of his philosophical deliberations and scientific 
investigations.86   
If Haldane’s orthodoxy was largely uncontested in the 1920s, over the next 
two decades the growing recognition of CWP in some coalfields, in part as a result of 
the lobbying by the miners’ unions (on the basis of “lay epidemiology”) and partly 
with growing scientific evidence, made refutation harder to sustain. One further factor 
may also explain Haldane apparent hubris in the face of mounting evidence 
challenging his views on coal dust, while other associates (such as Fisher) were 
showing signs of wavering.  This was apparent from his haute froideur in his public 
exchanges with critics, such as W. R. “Serecite” Jones, the south Wales physician 
with whom Haldane sparred in the pages of the Western Mail in 1934.  With 
Haldane’s position increasingly “swimming against a tide of evidence” by the early 
	
1930s, his “cultural authority” as an intellectual was being challenged and he was in 
danger of gaining unwanted “notoriety”.  In the twilight of his years, his lifetime’s 
corpus and standing were threatened.87 If Haldane’s views were affected by his social 
milieu and upbringing, with his hypothesis proving devastating in establishing the 
orthodoxy that it did, then his propagation of the harmlessness of coal dust to miners 
cannot be assumed to have resulted exclusively from his associations.  His steadfast 
defence of this orthodoxy was clearly linked to his own deeply held views about 
physiology.  In contrast, Britain’s coal owners found in Haldane’s views the means by 
which to stem compensation claims and block further legislative change.   
Conclusion 
The recognition of CWP by the government as a prescribed disease in 1943 was 
preceded by a number of important changes to the management of the industry.  The 
wartime coalition government established a Medical Consultative Service (MCS) as 
part of the 1942 White Paper on Coal.  This established a medical service at collieries 
and outside, and a thorough system for checking medical certificates and for health 
screening of employees.  As an indication of how dramatically the tide had turned 
against Haldane’s orthodoxy, recommending the measures in the white paper to 
Parliament, the Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Fuel and Power noted that 
a key function of the new MCS would be to screen for CWP.88  Nationalization, and 
the ongoing work of the MRC’s Pneumoconiosis Research Unit, saw considerable 
improvements in diagnosis of the disease and dust suppression, as well as in the 
professional development of mine management personnel.  The legacy of the latency 
in recognising of CWP, and combating it, was seen in the increase in mortalities 
attributed to the disease; between 1930 and 1990, 40,000 deaths from CWP were 
officially recorded. In part, these high figures reflected more effective diagnosis of the 
	
condition, and partly its incubation.  In their comprehensive study of CWP in the 
British coalfields, McIvor and Johnston suggest this is an under-estimate given that 
early cases were attributed to tuberculosis and silicosis, and that chronic bronchitis 
and emphysema did not become recorded as occupationally related diseases until 
1993.  The combination of NCB productivity drives and increased mechanization of 
coalface operations from the late 1950s compromised dust suppression campaigns, 
with worker’s health risked to maintain increasingly unrealistic production targets in 
many coalfields.89  Some measure of the full scale of this public health disaster may 
be gleaned from the 570,000 compensation claims made by miners and their families 
by the 2004 deadline for claims under the 1998 bronchitis and emphysema 
compensation schemes.90   
In Haldane, Britain’s coal owners found a valuable ally in the contests over 
miners’ health.   The internationally renowned physiologist and “intellectual”, with a 
respect for “practical men”, conferred gravitas on their case.  Though steeled by their 
pitched battles over nationalization and with the miners’ unions, the coal owners were 
inherently divided.  The same organization and leadership, which had brought them a 
victory of sorts in the public debates surrounding the Sankey Commission and in 1921 
and 1926, had also lost them political capital. From the perspective of the 
“entrepreneurial elite”, represented by figures such as Baldwin, Steel-Maitland and 
Cunliffe-Lister, where Sir Adam Nimmo and Evan Williams had provided a robust, 
dogged, and (at times) eloquent defence of private property, by the end of the miners’ 
lockout of 1926, they appeared as intransigent belligerents who had invoked class 
warfare and threatened to destabilize existing social hierarchies.  The inability of the 
industry, with a few exceptions, to adequately modernize, the almost suicidal 
competition for sales in some districts, and their obstruction of statutory attempts by 
	
the Mines Department to reform the industry, won them few friends amongst 
politicians and the public.  Their fate was further sealed in 1945 with the publication 
of the report of the technical advisory committee on coal mining, led by the prominent 
and well-respected mining engineer, Sir Charles Reid, which laid bare the technical 
shortcomings of private ownership.   
Against this backdrop, for a large number of colliery concerns reeling from the 
effects of the loss of foreign trade after the First World War, Haldane was invaluable 
in delaying the inevitable.  Indeed, this perhaps explains why the MAGB were not 
more vocal publicly about the silicosis orders and debates over CWP, sensing that 
their intervention might undermine Haldane’s credibility and the considerable sway 
he held in a number of important quarters and with key figures.  Yet the approach 
taken to the legislation, and the growing body of evidence of the dangers posed by 
dust to miners’ health, also reflected that independence to which the districts held on 
so tenaciously.  The approach of coal owners was governed by short-term financial 
ends, exhibiting a disregard for miners’ health and the welfare of their dependents.  
The remarks of owners, such as Sir Evan Williams, Budge and the AACC, reflected 
the deliberate and cynical use of such scientific evidence to blur eligibility for 
compensation on the lines of categorization and location. Where a response was 
forthcoming, it was belated and prompted by the rising cost of compensation, as well 
as the threat of further legislation and fresh claims.  
 In some districts, such as Durham and Scotland, no sense of urgency was 
shown in addressing the implications; rather it was viewed as a foreign matter and met 
with a cavalier disregard.  Admittedly this was not aided by the response of the Mines 
Inspectorate, and the influence exercised by Haldane and Collis through the HAC to 
Mines Department, and Fisher as Medical Inspector of Mines.  Crucially, the 
	
hegemony of the ‘knowledge systems’ advanced by Haldane and others pervaded 
mining education through the board of mining education to the mining schools (where 
the coal owners were able to exercise considerable influence).  This exercised a 
profoundly damaging effect by limiting the knowledge of those few managers able to 
attend.  While the majority did not have access to advanced technical education, and 
little real control over operations at their collieries. The effect was to breed a culture 
of complacency.  
In his upbringing and formative experiences (his social and cultural capital) 
Haldane was of the bourgeoisie.  Nevertheless to extrapolate from this that Haldane 
simply sold his professional integrity to the coal owners would be to disregard his 
lifetime’s work – including a genuine commitment to improving health and safety in 
mines, often through risky practical investigations – and dismiss the influence of his 
complex and changing views on physiology. Haldane’s apparent obduracy may also 
be explained by what he perceived to be a threat to his professional integrity.  As 
such, his views may owe more to a confluence of all these factors. Nevertheless his 
views were profoundly damaging because of his standing both at home and abroad. 
His refusal to accept the body of emerging medical evidence undoubtedly delayed 
acceptance of the risks of coal dust on miners’ health and the implementation of 
effective strategies for combating this.   
Ultimately though, it was the owners’ deployment of such expert opinion 
(‘buying brains’) that was underwritten by a cynical ploy to delay the inevitable flurry 
of compensation claims, in a climate of economic, and increasingly political 
uncertainty, which exposed miners (officials and managers) to greater risk and the 
families of those who could not work or were left behind to destitution.  And while a 
“lay epidemiology” did emerge amongst miners, and some officials and managers, 
	
combined with evidence emerging from medics in areas like south Wales – which 
ultimately convinced government, through the MRC, to pursue the mass 
epidemiological studies which were to prove so conclusive – they frequently and 
initially lacked status, power, and cultural authority to challenge the reigning 
orthodoxy. 
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